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1 Introduction
The focus on multiple unit auctions over the last fifteen years has partly been
motivated by the désire to explain the price-decline anomaly, a situation
where objects are sold at lower priées than identical objects sold earlier
during the same auction. Ashenfelter's (1989) finding of a price décline on
wine auction data was the starting point for a new development in the
theory of multiple unit auctions.1
Price trends raise many issues, since the expected revenue of the sellers
and/or gains for the buyers may dépend on the order in which the objects
are sold (for sellers) or on the right time to bid (for buyers). In this case, the
sellers sometimes negotiate with the auctioneer to obtain the best position
for the object in the sale:the auctioneer tries to maximize the revenue
generated by the sale, while the sellers try to maximize the expected sale
price (s) of their object(s).
Since Ashenfelter (1989), many empirical studies hâve found évidence
of declining priées in auctions of wine (McAfee and Vincent (1993), Di
Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1994) and Ginsburgh (1998)), condominium units
* The authors are very grateful to Victor Ginsburgh, Alan Kirman. Michel Lubrano. Peter Lyk-Jensen, Stephen
Martin, Costin Protopopescu and two anonymous référées for their helpful comments and suggestions. The
usual caveat applies.
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chanel@ehess.univ-mrs.fr.
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1 Although Buccola (1982) found statistical évidence of a price décline in cattle auctions by using hedonic
régressions.
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(Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992)), stamps (Taylor (1991)), commercial
properties (Lusht (1994)). jewelry (Chanel et. al. (1996)), vvorks of art
(Pesando and Shum (1996), Beggs and Graddy (1997)), flowers (Van den
Berg et al (2001)), fish (Pezanis-Christou (1997)) and so forth.
At first glance this price décline appears difficult to explain, because
theory shows that sequential auctions of identical objects should resuit
on average in identical or rising priées. Thèse results corne from Weber
(1983), where priées for identical objects follow a random walk in the case
of independent private values and display an upward drift in the case of
gênerai affîliated values.2 Because of this contradiction between the theory
and empirical data, declining priées are considered an anomaly. Part of the
debate in the literature concerns whether or not such an anomaly exists,
i.e. whether or not declining priées can be explained by certain market
characteristics and hence by rational bidders1 behavior (see Février (2003),
for a récent overview of such theoretical explanations). The purpose of this
paper, however, is to consider how price décline is computed in empirical
studies. Its novelty consists in checking whether the method itself might
not partly explain the phenomenon, and it shows the need for caution when
interpreting trends measured in empirical studies.
Measuring price trends in a dynamic world is neither an easy task nor
a neutral exercise. It is sufficient to recall the impassioned debates when
the Boskin Commission (1996), looking for a "more accurate measure of the
Cost of Living", concluded that the US consumer price index had an upward
bias of 1.1 percentage points per annum. Since pensions, wages, taxes and
transfers are generally index-linked to inflation, the existence of a bias has
obvious implications for the level of public debt.
The methods used in auction literature to compute price trends
require pairs of priées, and therefore, how a pair of lots in a parcel (a parcel
is a set of identical objects or lots of objects sold sequentially) is selected
worth investigating.3 The main findings of the paper are the following : the
choice of the pairs of priées in a parcel is crucial ; the size of the parcels and
the position of the lots in each parcel can influence the trend ; the methods
used to measure the price trend may lead to significantly différent results
when used on the same sample, and even worse. the same method can give
opposite results depending on the criterion used for selecting pairs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the main price
indices aggregating individual price variations and examines their properties
and their spread. Section 3 tests thèse indices on wine auction data. Several
hypothèses are tested using bootstrap techniques. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 See also Milgrom and Weber (2000).
3 Most of the empirical papers study price trends between two objects or two lots of objects. However the lots
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2 Measuring the trend
For sequential auctions of multiple lots sold successively, the séquence of
lots can be viewed as a sub-sale within the sale. The aim is to measure the
trend of this séquence.
2.1 Aggregating price variations of similar objects
Price variations hâve to be aggregated in order to compute an overall price
trend. This exercise is more complex than it sounds.
First, the objects are not fully identical. They can often be differen-
tiated : quality of colors or préservation can differ between two prints of the
same work; spécifie characteristics can explain a price différence between two
bottles of the same wine (the "fullness" of a bottle, the color of the wine,
the state of the cork, etc.).4 Information about the quality of the objects is
lost unless one attends the auction and/or the pre-sale exhibition. Buyers
may then take this information into account when bidding. If the objects
(although similar) are ranked and auctioned according to their quality, the
trend is likely to be downward biased.5
Second, quantifying the price trend means aggregating price variations
for parcels of similar goods. In effect, apart from the (hypothetical) case
where the same trend (increase. decrease or stability) exists for each of the
parcels, it is necessary to find a statistic that aggregates thèse variations,
and to interpret it. Auction results show that it is possible to observe a
50% price variation between the priées of two similar objects sold during
the same sale. Moreover, price levels of différent parcels may exhibit a
hundredfold variation ! It is therefore important to verify whether the choice
of aggregation mechanism can influence the resulting price trends.
Third, when there are more than two lots, some authors (Ashenfelter
(1989), McAfee and Vincent (1993)) arbitrarily choose a pair of lots. Section
3 explores the conséquences of such a choice on the valuation of the trend.
In this paper, we deliberately consider the lots within a parcel as
identical, as our purpose is to study the influence of the overall methodology
(the choice of the aggregation method and the sélection criteria within
the lots) on the resulting trends, and not to explain the trend observed.
Consequently, we use the index number theory to compare the methods
usually used to measure price trends in sequential auctions. Such numbers
(for example Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher, Walsch or Tornqvist indices) are
widely used for constructing price indices by aggregating the variations
observed between two periods (bilatéral index) or by chaining them in order
to study longer periods (multilatéral index).
4 See Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1994) for more détails.
5 Pesando and Shum (1996) mention for instance that Christieè and Sothebyà admit that when they sell two
prints of the same work during the same sale, the better quality print always appears irst.446 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
2.2 Two fréquently used indices and their drawbacks
Consider N parcels i, i = 1,...,N oî similar lots of objects sold at auction.
P? dénotes the price of a lot sold at rank n, n = 1, ...,n;, in parcel i; nt is
the number of lots in parcel i, with n; ^ 2 V i.
In this section, only pairs of similar lots are explored (hi = 2). Section
3 will consider différent ways of selecting pairs when there are more than
two similar lots in a parcel (nt > 2). Let Pf and Pf dénote the priées of
the two lots. Dénote the ratio Pf/P} as a*. Two types of price index are
frequently used for sequential auctions of multiple objects : the Arithmetic
Mean of Ratios (AMR) and the Ratio of the Sums of Priées (RSP).
The Arithmetic Mean of Ratios, certainly the most widely used
in auction literature, consists in Computing the ratio of the second price to
the first price for each pair of objects, and then Computing their arithmetic
mean:
i=l * t=]
This price index is used by Ashenfelter (1989), and McAfee and
Vincent (1993), in studies dealing with similar lots of wine. Both find that
the mean of the ratios is significantly less than one for each of the auction
houses, and conclude in favor of a price décline.
The Ratio of the Sums of Priées is the sum of the second priées
divided by the sum of the first priées. It aggregates first priées and second
priées, and can be written as :
yN p? yN pi
RSP = ^»=i ^ = ^»=i a%^ (2)
yN pi yN pi v ;
Pesando and Shum (1996) use the RSP method and find a price décline
for lots of identical Picasso prints. This method weights individual ratios
Oj differently according to the level of P/, and computes price variations in
a way that is closely related to the calculation of the yield of a financial
portfolio, where the number of each type of share is weighted by its
individual yield.
The spread between RSP and AMR dépends on the covariance and
the mean of the first priées (see appendix for détails) :
where cov {a,Pl) is the covariance between ai and P\
p
The axiomatic approach to index number theory (see Diewert (1987))
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bilatéral indices and unit quantity are : identity, proportionality, monotoni-
city, invariance to a change in scale, in units of measurement, symmetrical
treatment of time and mean value. The AMR does not satisfy the "time re
versai" property assuming symmetrical treatment of time, which is certainly
a serious flaw for a price index. Assume that two pairs of objects are sold
at priées of 10 and 20 for the first pair, and 20 and 10 for the second. The
arithmetic mean of the ratios is 1.25, an increase of 25%, although there
is actually no price increase.6 The RSP does not satisfy the "invariance to
change in units of measurement" property if this change only affects some
of the objects sold.
2.3 Two alternative indices
Let us consider two other indices, the Géométrie Mean of Ratios (GMR)
and the Fisher Price Index (FPI). They verify ail seven properties. However,
neither the GMR nor the FPI has apparently been used in the literature to
aggregate price movements in auctions. The Géométrie Mean of Ratios
can be written as :
GMR = (4)
where var(a) is the variance of a. This method requires every price to be
strictly positive, which is clearly the case with auction priées.
Using a second-order Taylor approximation, the différence between
GMR and AMR appears to be :
GMR - AMR ~ AMR x [exp
The Fisher Price Index often appears in the index number litera




where HMR = NJ Yl!i=\ Vai- Using a second order Taylor approximation,
we hâve :
FPI- AMR g -«ffffa) (7)
AMR
6 This drawback is known in the literature as çcomputation formula biasç{see Diewert (1998), and Reinsdorf
(1998)). According to the Boskin Commission (1996), it helps to explain the overestimation o1 the US
Consumer Price Index.448 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
An expression of the spread between FPI and GMR is given by :
(8)
Analytical expressions of the spreads make it possible to rank the
four price indices, given that P> and Pf are strictly positive. Hence,
var{a) = 0 implies AMR = FPI = GMR = RSP, whereas var(a) ^ 0
implies FPI<GMR<AMR. The ranking of RSP dépends on cov(a,Pl) :if
covfaP1) > 0, AMR<RSP, if cowfa.P1) < -°f^%lW < 0, RSP<FPI,
else we hâve FPI<RSP<AMR.
To summarize, GMR and FPI are always very close, AMR is always
larger than GMR and FPI, and AMR and RSP are very close only when
cov{a,Pl) is close to zéro. Hence, when var(a) is sufficiently large and/or
cov{a, P1) differs sufficiently from 0. différences between the estimators may
lead to différent conclusions when applied to real data.
3 Empirical évidence from wine auctions
The data analyzed are 2,947 lots of wine sold at Christie's London between
December 1995 and February 1996.7 A parcel is defined as a set of lots of
similar wine of same vintage, same capacity, same lot size (2, 6, 12, 24,...
bottles) sold sequentially. Hence, there are 1,160 lots of wine belonging to
427 parcels, each of whose size is between 2 and 7 lots.8 In section 3.1,
only the last two lots of each parcel are selected. This is how Ashenfelter
(1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1993) proceeded, and the following
sections explore whether the trend resulting from this choice is robust to
methodological changes. The influence on the price trends of factors such
as the analytical method used, the size of the parcel and the position of lots
within the parcels is studied.
3.1 Comparing the four estimators
Priées between the last two lots of each parcel (referred to as sample 1) did
not change in 282 cases (66%), decreased in 127 cases (29.7%) and increased
in 18 cases (4.3%). The four indices, when computed for the 427 pairs of
priées, confirm thèse first findings, each being négative, between -1.53% for
AMR. and -1.84% for RSP. They are denoted 0{ in Table 1.
7 We are very grateful to Victor Ginsburgh for allowing us to use his data.
8 The data consist of 244 parcels of 2 lots, 104 parcels of 3 lots. 51 parcels of 4 lots, 15 parcels of 5 lots, 11
parcels of 6 lots and two parcels of 7 lots.Olivier Chanel, Stéphanie Vincent 449
Table 1 : Statistics for the jour estimators for observed auction priées
AMR GMR RSP FPI
Original 6t (in %) -1.532 -1.646 -1.844 -1.667
Sample 1
Bootstrap 1 0{ (in %) -1.536 -1.649 -1.846 -1.670
sample a\ (xlO~2) 0.201 0.245 0.315 0.259
(Last two 95% conf. interval (-1.96, -1.17) (-2.17,-1.22) (-2.51, -1.28) (-2.23, -1.22)
lots of P-value for 0J = 0i 0.973 0.951 0.967 0.942
the parcel) P-value for éfr = 0 0 0 0 0
Original 92 (in %) -2.320 -2.475 -2.697 -2.506
Sample 2
Bootstrap 2 0£ (in %) -2.319 -2.473 -2.698 -2.504
sample a2 (xlO~2) 0.234 0.285 0.427 0.305
(First and 95% conf. interval (-2.80, -1.89) (-3.08, -1.97) (-3.60,-1.92) (-3.16, -1.97)
last lots of P-value for 0| = Ô2 0.971 0.950 0.954 0.940
the parcel) P-value for 9\ = 0 0 0 0 0
P-value for flî = 6% 0 0 0 0
The 427 price pairs observed are considered to be drawn from a pair of
unknown distribution functions,9 which will be used to study the empirical
distributions and test the différence between the indices with bootstrap
procédures.
427 pairs of priées were drawn with replacement from the 427 observed
pairs. Then the four indices 0£ (AMR, GMR, RSP and FPI) were computed
for thèse pairs. This was done B times, and resulted in B values 0£ =
0\,...,6*B for each of the indices. The empirical distribution for each 6*, its
mean 9* and its variance (<r*)2 were also computed. It was then possible
to observe their distribution and to test the spreads between methods.
Bickel and Freedman (1981) showed, using Mallows distance, that the
empirical distribution of 8* is a convergent and unbiased estimator of the
true distribution of 6, if both the number of replications B and the size N
of the original data are large.
The number of replications B was set at 9,999, which is large enough
to allow standard error and confidence interval computations according to
Efron and Tibshirani (1993). Results can be found in Table 1 for each of
the four index estimators (bootstrap sample 1) : the mean 0*, the standard
déviation <rj and the 95% confidence interval of the mean based on the
percentile distribution. The underlying distributions are represented in
Figure 1 and confirm noticeable différences in location and dispersion among
the four estimators.
Equality tests assume that the mean of an index estimator is equal
to a given value under the null hypothesis. They are conducted on the
9 A joint normality test for each of the distributions points to log-normality at the 2.5% signiicance level. The
mean and standard déviation are 420.5 and 484 for the irst price distribution, and 412.8 and 474 for the
second distribution.450 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
Figure 1 Bootstrap distribution for four relovont estlmators, 9.909 replicatlons
(sample 1 )
■2.5% -2,0% .1.5% -1.0%
Growth rato <ln %)
bootstrap percentile distribution for each index (see Table 1). Bilatéral
equality tests 9\ = 0\ showed that no method is significantly biased, and
bilatéral equality tests 6\ = 0 confirmed a significant décline. The results
obtained for each method are consistent and there is no doubt that priées
décline in this sample. An important question is whether the four methods
yield significantly différent results on the magnitude of the price trend.
Equality tests between trends assume that the mean différence
between two indices is zéro under the null hypothesis. However, it would be
meaningless to compare, two by two, the three indices linked by the strict
inequality obtained in Section 2 (FPI<GMR<AMR). As a conséquence,
rather than testing that the mean différence is strictly equal to zéro, the null
hypothesis is that the différence between two indices is very small (less than
1% of the average index estimator, i.e. less than 0.0165%). Each test uses
the bootstrap percentile distribution of the différence between two indices
as an estimator of the distribution of their différences. The null hypothesis
is rejected for five tests out of six (p-value < 0.05) but not rejected for
GMR-FPI (p-value = 0.373).
The equality tests between trends based on différences do not take
into account the index distribution. Hence, the non-parametric distribution
free Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is computed for each comparison. The null
hypothesis is that the distribution of the two index estimators is similar. The
maximum absolute différence between the cumulative distributions is com
puted and cornpared with the appropriate critical values (see for instance
Daniel (1990)). The equality of the distributions for each comparison is very
strongly rejected (p-value < 0.001) except for GMR-FPI (p-value=0.338).Olivier Chanel, Stéphanie Vincent 451
Figure 2 Cumulative Fraction Plots for Kolmogorov-Smlrnov Test
•3.0% ■2,8% -2.6% -2.4% •2.2% -2.0% -1.8%
Growth rat» for AMR (In %)
•1.8% -1.4% •1.2% ■1.0%
The bootstrap cumulative fraction plots corresponding to each index are
shown in Figure 2 and confirm the closeness between GMR and FPI.
The fact that three index estimators out of four cannot be considered
as having the same distribution suggests that caution is in order when the
décline is not large.
3.2 The importance of choosing pairs
When a parcel contains more than two lots (this occurs for 183 out of 427
parcels in the data), there are différent arbitrary ways of selecting a pair
of priées. In order to study the sensitivity of the results to this choice, a
second sample (referred to as sample 2) is constructed, in which the priées
of the first and last lots of each of the 427 parcels, instead of the two last
lots, are compared. It should be noted that only the first price of each pair
was différent from the previous sample.
The bootstrap distribution of the estimators is computed for thèse
new pairs and the statistics are also given in the lower part of Table 1. The
décline is larger than above and significant for each method (p-value = 0
for ail #2 = 0 tests). The différence between bootstrap estimators Ô\ and
0?2 - based on the bootstrap percentile distribution of their différence - is
highly significant for each method (p-values<0.001 ), which indicates that
the position of a lot in (and/or the size of ) a parcel is a relevant pièce of
information. This resuit is consistent with van den Berg et al. (2001) who
observe in flower auctions that the fewer the remaining number of lots in a
parcel, the larger the price décline.452 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
Table 2 :
Lot position in the parcel
No. of pairs
AMR (in %)
P-value of nullity test
GMR (in %)
P-value of nullity test
RSP (in %)
P-value of nullity test
FPI (in %)































































Marginal significance levels (p-values) are computed from the bootstrap distribu
tions.
The price effects spécifie to the position of the lots in the parcel are
detailed in Table 2.
The average décline between two successive pairs varies from —1.37
to —1.66%. For ail the methods, there is a significant price décline between
lots 1 and 2 (—1.64 to —1.96%, p-value close to 0). The additional décline
between lots 2 and 3 is smaller but also significant (—1.27 to 1.57%). For
the next lots (3 and 4, 4 and 5), the décline is even smaller and significant
at the 5% level. Thèse results confirm the importance of the choice of pairs
when Computing price indices.
In fact, this is the resuit of two factors : a "position in the parcel"
effect and a "size of the parcel" effect.10 Figure 3 represents the effect of
the position of the pair depending on the parcels' size for AMR (results are
almost identical for the other estimators). For a given size, the price décline
between two successive lots is generally smaller when lots are positioned
higher. An overall increase is observed when parcels of différent sizes are
pooled.
Figure 4 represents the effect of parcel size depending on the position
of the pair. The price décline between two successive lots is generally smaller
when parcel size increases, although there are différences depending on
position in the parcel. The larger the size of the parcel, the smaller the
average price décline between the successive lots of this parcel. The size effect
is weaker than the position effect but both are significant when separately
estimated in a régression équation.11
Parcel size therefore constitutes relevant information when studying
price trends in sequential auctions. The fact that priées décline the lower the
10 We are grateful to an anonymous référée that drew our attention to this point.
11 The strong corrélation that obviously exists between thèse two effects certainly explains why a régression
analysis does not give signiicant results when both effects are included. Van den Berg étal. (2001), when
studying the effect of the position of the lot and the remaining number of lots (see their Table 3), in fact
measure a joint çsiae-positioné effect and a joint çsœ-remaining number of lotsé effect. As they are only
interested in comparing the position effect and the çremaining number of lotsé effect. their conclusions
remain valid.Olivier Chanel, Stéphanie Vincent 453
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position of lots within a parcel probably results from stronger compétition
between bidders for the first lots. This compétition may resuit from a supply
uncertainty due to the présence of written bids and the existence of a buyer's
option that allows the winner of the first lot in a parcel to buy any number of
similar lots from the parcel at the same price. Indeed, oral bidders know that
the first lot of each parcel is the only one they are certain to compete for.454 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
3.3 Does the direction of the trend dépend on the way it is
computed ?
As shown previously, différent price trends can be obtained by choosing
différent pairs when using the same method. It is interesting to détermine
whether the way the price trend is computed may also influence its direction
(upward or downward). However, the price trends established on the
previous wine data show a very significant décline, and findings regarding
their direction did not change depending on the method or the criterion
chosen for selecting pairs. Moreover, identical objects generally imply a
rather small variance for o, and Section 2 shows that the four methods
lead to similar results in this situation. Yet it is possible to use the data to
mimic a weak trend. The price vector P2 is thus set to P2 = (0.98)-1 P2
in order to shift the distribution of each of the four estimators to the right.
The corresponding distributions 9\ (last two lots) and 02 (fîrst and last lots)
of each estimator are simulated by bootstrapping. Unilatéral equality tests
<?i = 0 and #2 = 0 are then conducted. If equality is confirmed, there is
no trend and priées are stable. If equality is not confirmed, the sign of the
estimator détermines the direction of the trend (increase or decrease), and
the bootstrap percentile p-value gives the level of significance.
The results are given in Table 3 and can be interpreted as follows.
For each of the four indices, the resuit of the tests 0] = 0 and 02 = 0
is represented in boldface type in a column and in italic type in a row,
respectively. Each cell checks whether the two ways of selecting pairs lead
to identical conclusions for the same method on the diagonal, or for différent
methods off the diagonal.
Figura 5 Simulated bootstrap distribution for différent estlmatora, 0,990 repllcatlons
■1.0% -0.5% 0.0%
Growiti rate lin %)Olivier Chanel, Stéphanie Vincent 455











































For each estimator, the conclusion of equality test 8\ — 0 is in boldface and 02 = 0
is in italic. dec for decrease, inc for increase and sta for stability.
* : p-value < 0.10; ** : p-value < 0.05.
Analyzing Table 3 by column (or by row) shows that the direction of
the price trend computed with RSP (or with AMR) differs from the one
obtained by the other three methods. The diagonal shows that the same
method applied with différent criteria for extraction from the parcels leads to
différent conclusions, and even to opposite conclusions with GMR and FPI
(increase vs. decrease). Finally, différent methods with différent extraction
criteria lead to the same conclusion in only one case out of 12, to différent
conclusions in four cases and to opposite conclusions in the remaining seven
cases !
Figure 5 illustrâtes two of the most puzzling results. First, the
distribution of RSP in sample 1. Ô\, (or AMR in sample 2, 62) is not
significantly différent from zéro whereas the three other index estimators
are increasing (or decreasing). Second, the GMR distributions in both
samples. 9\ and O2. show substantial différences, which confirais the previous
conclusion that the trends are opposite (as seen in Table 3).
Hence, in the case of weak trends, two methods, even based on the
same extraction criterion, may lead to différent conclusions.456 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess the sensitivity of the measurement of
price trends in sequential auctions to methodological choices. We purposely
consider the objects sold as identical, and study the properties and the
dispersion of four common price indices in this framework. Wine auction
data are used to compute (and simulate) their spread and to test various
hypothèses.
The main conclusion is that the choice of a method to measure the
price trend is problematic. Différent methods may lead to différent results
when applied to real auction priées, in particular with weak trends. In
order to limit spécifie bias, it is certainly worth Computing three index
numbers : AMR, RSP and either GMR or FPI (considering their respective
distributions are not significantly différent) to détermine and quantify price
trends. The choice of the pairs of objects, the size of the parcels and the
position of the lots in each parcel also influence the results.
Lastly, bearing in mind that similar objects are not strictly identical
and that some différences may only be observed by bidders attending the
auction, thereby influencing their valuations, conventional approaches used
to study price movements for homogeneous goods may not be correct. When
thèse différences are known, a better approach may be to first run hedonic
régressions explaining priées by référence to objective characteristics of the
objects (including quality différences), and tlien to compute the différent
measurements of the price trend, corrected for quality différences.
Appendix
Notation
Consider a sample a,-,..., a.\- an iid à where à is a positive random variable with
finite variance.
Let us define the following quantities :
t=i
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FPI = [AMR x HMR} * , (12)
Efli pt E [pi]
RSP= y'vP' " E[Pt1} ' î = 1'---'A/'' (13)
It is recalled that a second-order Taylor séries approximation of f(ai) around E[a,}
is:
/ (ai) ~ / [E (ai)} + f [E (ai)} x[ai-E (ai)} + ±/" [E (o*)] x [ou - E(at)}2 .
Hence, E [f (ai)} is equal to :
E [f (ai)} ~ / [E (ai)} + \f [E (a,)] x var (a*), (14)
where var (ai) is the variance of ai, i = 1,..., N.
Approximation of the bias between AMR and RSP
Rewrite E(Pf) as :
E (Pf) = E (aiPl) = E(ai) E (P?) + cav (a,, P/) i = 1,...,N,
where cov(-) dénotes the covariance.
Hence, by (13) :
i = l,...,JV.
Approximation of the bias between AMR and GMR
Note that \n(GMR) = (1/N) £* j ln(a*) and that
\n(AMR) = In (1/Ar) 53|_, a, the logarithm function being concave, Jensen's
inequality yields :
In (AMR) > In (GMR).
Hence
In (AMR) - In (GMR) ^ 0.
Taking a second-order Taylor séries approximation of ln(aj) around E(at), and
from (14), we obtain :
Hence,
\n(AMR) - \n(GMR) ~ ^ x
[E(ai)Y458 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(4), 2004
Prom there, the exponential yields :
(-05;;;^') (15)
Approximation of the bias between FPI and AMR
The approximation of the substitution bias formula for the CPI (see Diewert
(1998)) is used and adapted to the bilatéral framework.
Let e be the random variable defined by the values :
Note that
Moreover, according to (10), HMR may be written as :
Taking a second-order Taylor séries approximation of et l around Si = 1, and
according to (14) :
In order to obtain the inverse development for E(e~i), the coefficients in the
identity E (e~1)x [E (e'1)]'1 =1 are characterized and after some computation,
it follows that :
Substituting HMR in (12), leads to :
FPI~E(ai)x[l-var(ei)]i .
Taking the second-order Taylor séries approximation of var(£i) around 0 yields :
FPI ~ £(a,-) x [1 - 0.5var(e,)].
Hence, from (16) and (9) :Olivier Chanel, Stéphanie Vincent 459
Approximation of the bias between FPI and GMR
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